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Abstract:  Our study examines how chronic sleep restriction and suboptimal times-of-day affect 
decisions in a classic set of social tasks.  We experimentally manipulate and objectively 
measured sleep in 184 young-adult subjects, who were also randomly assigned an early 
morning or late evening experiment session during which decision tasks were administered.  
Sleep restriction and suboptimal time-of-day are both estimated to either directly or indirectly 
(via an impact on sleepiness) reduce altruism, trust, and trustworthiness.  We conclude that 
commonly experienced adverse sleep states, most notably chronic sleep restriction, 
significantly reduce prosocial behaviors, and can therefore limit benefits from short-term social 
interactions.   
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1.  Introduction 
Prosocial behaviors help encourage positive interactions and promote economic institutions 
that require trust/trustworthiness.  There are numerous factors that may influence the 
propensity to exhibit prosocial behaviors. The variable considered in this paper is one that 
receives little attention in this area of decision-making research: sleepiness. We examine the 
impact of commonly experienced sleep and circadian states on outcomes in three well-known 
simple social interaction tasks:  the ultimatum, dictator, and trust games.  Prosocial behaviors in 
these games, such as trust, are at least a simple indication of social capital of the decision 
maker (Putnam, 1993).  Some researchers have even found that increases in survey-based 
measures of country-level trust promote desirable macroeconomic outcomes, such as 
increased economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) or reduced government corruption 
(LaPorta et al., 1997).  As such, factors that influence the micro-level choice to behave 
prosocially—a type of individual investment in social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002)—have 
multiplier effects in society and the economy, and so the importance of this decision domain 
should not be underestimated. 
The limited research that exists on sleep loss and simple social decisions has utilized 
highly controlled total sleep loss protocols (Anderson and Dickinson, 2010; Ferrara et al., 2015).  
Such protocols help establish the dose-response of behavior to extreme levels of sleep loss, but 
the external validity of such findings remains unclear.  Observation or field data on sleep levels 
and choice are highly externally valid, but the limited or lack of experimental control in such 
data (or the potential bias in self-reports of one’s sleep level) reduce one’s ability to identify 
causal effects.  In short, we believe that generating primary experimental data using an 
ecologically valid sleep setting is a valuable approach for studying this particular research 
question.  Here, we utilized an at-home sleep manipulation protocol with objective sleep data 
acquisition, random treatment assignments, and within-subjects behavioral measures, which 
increase our ability to claim causal effects.  Sleepiness is one of the more concerning health 
trends at present, and so sleepy decision-making is hardly a rare occurrence.  Nevertheless, the 
weight of the research on sleep and decision making has focused on individual decision tasks 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
3 
 
(e.g., Harrison and Horne, 2000; Killgore et al., 2006), which leaves a gap in our understanding 
of how adverse sleep states affect choices in a critical decision domain.  
A main contribution of our work is to experimentally manipulate sleep in ecologically 
valid ways that are highly applicable to the real world—the levels of sleep restriction we 
examine are pervasive in modern society and part of everyday life for nearly 30% of U.S. adults 
(Schoenborn and Adams, 2010).  And, while the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
has labeled sleep deprivation a public health epidemic, little is known about how commonly 
experienced adverse sleep states impact social interactions.  We hypothesize that increased 
sleepiness will reduce prosocial behaviors given the (limited) related research and given our 
understanding of deliberative thinking and social decisions (Anderson and Dickinson, 2010; 
Ferrara et al., 2015; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2001; Chee 
and Chuah, 2008).  This hypothesis suggests that sleepiness leads to inefficiencies or unrealized 
benefits in social exchanges.  
Results from our 3-week at-home sleep protocol study indicate that both sleep 
restriction and suboptimal time of day either directly or indirectly (through sleepiness) reduce 
simple behavioral measures of prosocial decisions.  Estimated reductions in dictator giving are 
the most robust, though our multivariate estimation results show significant decreases for trust 
and trustworthiness in most specifications as well.  Given that these simple games can be 
considered building blocks for more complex social interactions, such findings have important 
implications.  A significant portion of adults in many countries have habitual sleep levels similar 
to those we study, and sleep restricted decision-making at suboptimal times of day is common 
in modern society as well.  Our data draw attention to a typically overlooked behavioral “cost” 
of these modern sleep trends.  At least in the area of social interactions, sleepiness may 
contribute to a type of dead-weight loss of potential benefits that has not been previously 
highlighted. 
 
    1.1  Background 
Our behavioral hypothesis stems from the argument that prosocial behavior requires 
deliberative thinking and active suppression of myopic self-interest (Rilling and Sanfey., 2011; 
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McCabe et al., 2001; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Achtziger et al., 2016).  Interestingly, recent 
evidence suggests that reduced deliberation may promote altruism and cooperation in certain 
contexts (Rand, et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2016), although other studies found 
no such relationship (Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014; Tinghög et al., 2013; Krajbich et al., 
2015).  It is important to note, however, that these studies typically employ standard cognitive 
load or time pressure manipulations that are not directly comparable to our manipulation.1  
Another distinct manipulation in the literature that is intended to reduce deliberation is 
referred to as “ego depletion”, which seems to impact motivational aspects of task 
performance more than cognition (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012).2  Notably, Ainsworth et al. 
(2012) reported reduced trust following ego depletion, and a study by Vohs et al. (2010) 
crossed ego-depletion with sleep deprivation and found that only ego-depletion influenced the 
expression of the negative social behavior of aggression.  Thus, the existing research leads to 
the natural question of whether we believe our sleep manipulations will affect pro-social 
behavior by harming cognition or task motivation.  
It has been argued that sleep loss may impact motivation as well as cognition, but the 
mixed evidence includes examples where no significant motivation decline is reported (e.g., 
Drummond et al, 2005), while others report significant motivational decline following sleep 
deprivation (e.g., Almklov et al, 2014).  However, even when short, novel, or incentivized tasks 
are used to mitigate motivational decline caused by sleep loss (see Alhola and Polo-Kantola, 
2007, and sources therein), performance decrements are still observed. This argues that 
cognitive effects likely dominate any motivation effects of our treatment manipulation—our 
tasks are incentivized, short, and relatively novel for the subjects.  Another recent study 
concludes that self-regulation (the target of ego depletion manipulations) and fatigue are not 
overlapping constructs (Vohs et al, 2010), which supports our view of dominant cognition 
effects over motivational effects in our design.  Thus, compared to commonly used alternative 
protocols aimed at reducing deliberative processes, ours is unique and focused on cognitive 
                                                          
1
 Distinct from the other studies mentioned, Krahbich et al, 2015, examined patients with prefrontal lesions. 
2
 With an ego depletion manipulation, a subject is made to exert self-control of some sort at time t, and then 
administration of another task requiring self-control is administered at time t+1.  Ego depletion is meant to reduce 
one’s capacity to self-regulate in the time t+1 task. 
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effects of mild adverse sleep states. We also argue that our ecologically valid at-home sleep 
protocol implies that our results have more clear implications for real world decision makers.   
For our research question, another relevant stream of literature has identified the 
importance of deliberative thinking for prosocial decisions (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Krajbich et 
al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2001; Fehr and Camerer, 2007).  This is important because the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) is particularly vulnerable to sleep deprivation. Some studies report 
negative sleep impacts on PFC function (Horne, 1993; Muzur et al, 2002; Chee and Chua, 2008), 
and Horne (1993) reports a more general link between sleep deprivation and reduced PFC 
activation. This is consistent with recent neural and behavioral studies showing the negative 
impact of adverse sleep or circadian states on deliberative decisions (Yoo et al., 2007; McElroy 
and Dickinson, 2010; Dickinson and McElroy, 2010). However, in other contexts researchers 
have reported increased PFC activation following sleep deprivation.  For example, 
compensatory PFC activation on a verbal learning task is reported in Drummond et al. (2000) 
following total sleep loss.  Regarding decision making studies, Venkatraman et al. (2011) 
documented increased ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) activation following sleep deprivation in a 
risk-taking task.  The authors attributed the increase in vmPFC activation following sleep loss to 
an increased focus on monetary gains. However, rather than improving decision making, 
increased vmPFC activation appears to suggest an optimism bias triggered by sleep loss (see 
also Venkatraman et al., 2007; 2009).  Our interpretation of this literature is that sleep 
deprivation, while increasing some PFC activation on certain tasks, has not been found to 
improve deliberative processes useful for optimal decision making. In fact, others have noted 
the negative impact of sleep loss on decisions that rely particularly on the vmPFC (Killgore et al., 
2012). 
Somewhat related to the issue of PFC importance in social decisions, researchers have 
reported higher altruism and trust levels in older adolescents (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 
2008; Fehr et al., 2013).   Such findings also support the hypothesis that the PFC, which 
develops later than other brain regions, is important for prosocial choice.  As a whole, we find 
that the weight of the existing evidence suggests PFC vulnerability to adverse sleep or circadian 
states, and PFC function is important for prosocial choice.  While this is a somewhat overly 
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simplified characterization of the literature, it is useful in organizing our thinking and forming 
our hypothesis regarding the likely impact of our experiment manipulation in the domain of 
social choice.  Our hypothesis can be succinctly stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis:  Sleepy subjects—whether from sleep restriction or suboptimal time of 
day—will make less prosocial decisions.  
 
    1.2  Experimental Protocol  
Our starting point was to first generate a database of young-adults (18-39 year olds) for 
whom we had specific sleep-related information—some of this was to address inclusion criteria 
for the main experimental study and some was in order to manage random session-time 
assignments.  We first administered a large-scale online survey that included questions on basic 
demographics, recent sleep habits, validated anxiety and depressive disorder screener 
questions, and a validated morningness-eveningness questionnaire.  Over multiple waves of the 
online survey we generated several thousand responses to our survey (mostly student 
responses).3  Criteria for viable subjects for the main study included: those below standard 
cutoffs for risk of major depressive or anxiety disorder, no diagnosed sleep disorder or self-
reported insomnia, between 18-39 years of age.  To assess diurnal preference, the survey 
administered a validated short form of the morningness-eveningness questionnaire, henceforth 
rMEQ (Adan and Almiral, 1991).  The rMEQ classifies individuals on a continuous scale of 4-25, 
with morning-types having a rMEQ score from 18-25 and evening-types having a rMEQ score 
from 4-11.  Though based on subject self-reports, the methodology has been validated against 
physiological data on oral temperatures (Horne and Östberg, 1976) and is a standard tool in 
circadian research. A validated measure of diurnal preference was necessary for the validity of 
our random session time assignments. 
                                                          
3
 While some have argued that laboratory experiments may overstate social behaviors (Levitt and List, 2007), 
recent research suggests that the use of student subject pools may, if anything, underestimate the importance of 
social behaviors in the general population (Falk et al, 2013).  What is important is to note that the qualitative 
direction of our results suggest damaging effects of relatively mild adverse sleep states on prosocial behaviors. 
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We identified morning-types (MT) and evening-types (ET) in the database and randomly 
assigned each potential subject, ex ante, to a morning (7:30 a.m.) or an evening (10:00 p.m.) 
experiment session prior to sending out recruitment emails.  Due to the rarity of true MT 
subjects—less than 10% in young adult populations are morning-types (see Chelminski et al, 
2000)—we extended our rMEQ cutoff for MT to include rMEQ scores of 16 and 17. To 
compensate, we only recruited the more extreme (and still abundant) ET subjects with rMEQ 
scores from 4-9.4  This approach helped ensure that the sample we recruited for the main study 
was comprised of individuals with true morningness or eveningness preferences.5 
 For the main study, subjects were recruited for a 3-week experiment protocol with 
multiple in-lab sessions each occurring at the same randomly assigned time-of-day for that 
subject.  The 3-week protocol allowed for a within-subjects manipulation of at-home sleep 
levels, as discussed in the next paragraph.  Another design option would have been to vary the 
time of day for the lab sessions such that each subject was administered decision tasks both at 
a more optimal (circadian matched) and less optimal (circadian mismatched, MM) time of day.  
That is, a within-subjects circadian mismatch protocol was an alternative design choice. 
However, one of our concerns was subject scheduling and the difficulties in recruiting and 
preserving participation of subjects with non-constant session times-of-day, and so we chose to 
proceed with the circadian portion of the protocol as a between-subjects design feature (see 
Dickinson et al, 2016, for a more complete discussion of subject attrition in this design).  Other 
researchers may wish to examine optimal versus sub-optimal times-of-day in decision making 
as a within-subject design factor, but our design choice was to favor additional statistical power 
along the at-home sleep restriction dimension. 
Subjects were recruited in groups (average size was about 13 subjects) and, while each 
experimental group was either designated a “morning session” or “evening session” group, 
                                                          
4
 In this way, our sample was still drawn from the tails of the rMEQ distribution and eliminated the same amount 
of support from the non-tail portion of the rMEQ distribution compared to if we had used the traditional MT cutoff 
(rMEQ=18) but included non-extreme ET (rMEQ=10-11) in our sample. 
5
 Others studies have assessed diurnal preferences only after recruitment, and then used a median split to classify 
subjects as morning-types or evening-types (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008).  Given the 
distribution of diurnal preferences among young adult subjects (see Chelminski et al, 2000), the approach will 
incorrectly classify many intermediate or indeterminate type subjects as morning-types. 
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there was a mix of morning-type and evening-type subjects in each group.  Figure 1 shows the 
timeline of the protocol and when the decision experiment sessions took place.  As can be seen, 
each subject was prescribed a well-rested (WR:  8-9 hrs/night in bed) and a sleep-restricted (SR:  
5-6 hrs/night in bed) week with an ad-lib sleep week in between.  A small number (n=30) of 
control subjects were recruited as well to assess pure repeat administration effects.  Control 
subjects were intermediate diurnal preference individuals, attended experiment sessions at 
mid-day (neither early nor late), and they were assigned WR sleep weeks in both Week 1 and 
Week 3 of the protocol.   
The set of bargaining tasks was administered at the end of weeks 1 and 3 (i.e., at the 
end of each sleep treatment week).  Because the session time-of-day remains constant for a 
given subject, this is a mixed design with between-subjects (circadian match/mismatch) and 
within-subjects (SR/WR) components.  Subject sleep levels are objectively monitored during the 
entire three weeks with actigraphy devices that allow for raw data output (see Appendix for 
model of devices, which are commonly used in sleep and clinical research and are well-
validated).  Scoring the sleep data involved complementary sleep diary input as well as the 
objective actigraphy data, and subjects were paid a separate fixed payment ($80) for providing 
the 3 weeks of sleep data.  Subjects were deemed compliant if average nightly sleep during the 
WR week was at least 60 minutes more than during the SR week.  The Appendix discusses the 
legitimacy and data-driven approach to this standard for compliance in detail (see also 
Dickinson et al, 2016, for more extensive details and analysis of the sleep protocol). 
 
    1.3  Decision Tasks 
We administered the ultimatum (Güth et al., 1982), Dictator game (Forsythe, et al., 
1994), and Trust games (Berg et al., 1995) twice for each subject—once following SR and once 
following WR.  For the Ultimatum and Dictator games we used a $10 starting sum.  In the 
Ultimatum game, the first-mover proposes a division of the $10 and the second-mover may 
either accept or reject the offer.  Both players receive a zero payoff if the offer is rejected.  The 
Dictator game removes the second-mover decision from the game, such that the dictator 
simply decides how the $10 will be divided between the two players.  For the $10 Trust game 
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we did not endow the responder with any money, (and so, a subject attempting to equalize 
first-mover/second-mover earnings will send back a different amount than if both first and 
second-mover were endowed with $10).  The first mover may choose to pass (trust) some, all, 
or none of the $10 to the second-mover.  Whatever is trusted to the second mover is then 
tripled by the experimenter, and the second-mover can then choose to pass back some, all, or 
none of the tripled amount.  The amount passed back is generally viewed as a measure of 
trustworthiness.  We also administered a “risk” version of the Trust game where the second-
mover is a pass-back algorithm rather than another subject in the group.  In this way, we can 
identify the importance of the social interaction, as opposed to the pure risk of passing money, 
in making the interpersonal decision (see Sanfey et al., 2003; Kosfeld et al., 2005). 
The games were administered via the strategy method whereby all subjects made 
decisions as first-mover and second-mover prior to knowing to which role he/she was randomly 
assigned.  This procedure requires subjects to make decisions as a second-mover in the 
Ultimatum and Trust games for all possible contingencies of what the first mover might do.  It 
was common knowledge that we would make random role assignments (first- or second-
mover), anonymous counterpart assignments, and randomly select one of games for payoff for 
that decision session only after all decisions were made for all tasks.  Outcomes for the 
randomly selected payoff game were only revealed at the end of the decision session, when 
payoffs for these and other decision tasks were given out in cash.6  During the second decision 
session (Session 3 in Figure 1) subjects were informed that the roles, counterparts, and the 
payoff game were re-randomized (i.e., not the same as in the first decision session). 
In total, we recruited 184 young adults (30 control: 154 treatment: 18-39 years old, 
mean 21.66 ± 4.43 years old) to participate in the 3-week study.  The relevance of our results to 
real world decision makers are, in large part, due to an at-home sleep and circadian protocol 
                                                          
6
 Note that the fixed payment for participation was separate from the cash incentive payments for outcomes in the 
decision experiments.  Subjects could receive the $80 fixed payment by check or Amazon gift code, which was sent 
out several days after the end of the experiment so that sleep data could be first checked for instances of apparent 
gross noncompliance.   The compliance standard for issuing experiment payment was more liberal than the 
standard we used for considering the sleep data compliant with the treatment condition.  In general, to maintain 
satisfaction in the subject pool, our position was to fully pay subjects for what appeared a good faith effort at 
compliance, even if data were ultimately considered noncompliant for analysis purposes.  This more liberal 
payment policy was not known to subjects during their participation.  
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with high ecological validity.  Table 1 shows the mix or circadian matched versus mismatched 
subjects for the between-subjects component of the design.  Of these 184 subjects, 149 (30 
control: 119 treatment) were deemed compliant based on objective actigraphy data.7  
Compliant treatment subjects slept a minimum of 1 hour more per night during the SR week 
than the WR week, but there was variation in the level of compliance (e.g., the average 
difference between WR and SR nightly sleep was about 1.5 hours).  The results below are based 
on the subset of compliant treatment subjects (n=119). 
 
2.  Results 
Subjects self-reported sleepiness during the decision sessions using the Karolinska 
Sleepiness scale (Åkerstedt and Billberg, 1990; Kaida et al., 2006).  To test treatment 
manipulations we regress self-report sleepiness on treatment, demographics, and sleep control 
variables.  Both SR and circadian mismatch significantly increased sleepiness (p<.01), as noted 
below,8 which is evidence of the validity of the protocol at manipulating sleepiness.  In Table 2 
we present descriptive statistics of the behavioral outcomes from each task, along with 
nonparametric tests of means.  Nonparametric tests of the SR treatment effect uses the signed-
rank test for matched data given each subject makes decisions under both SR=0 and SR=1 
conditions.  For testing means of behavioral outcomes resulting from circadian mismatch (MM), 
we used the Mann-Whitney test for unmatched data after first averaging each subject’s 
decisions for a task across the two decision sessions. Given our experimental design choice, the 
test for MM effects is inherently less statistically powerful than our tests of SR effects on 
behavioral outcomes.  Results in Table 2 indicate marginally significant SR effects on Dictator 
offers and trust decisions.  Of course, such tests do not take into account other covariates, and 
so a more controlled statistical analysis follows. 
                                                          
7
 A small number of treatment-subject observations were lost due to malfunction or corruption of actigraphy 
devices (9 subjects).  The final sample of 119 compliant subjects and 30 control subjects all had complete 
actigraphy data records. 
8
 The full results of this estimation are shown in Table 6, which is the first stage regression of the two-stage 
endogenous variables regression used to evaluate sleepiness as a mediating variable in evaluating behavioral 
outcomes. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
11 
 
We next present results from the multivariate analysis. The general model structure we 
estimate is:  Yt = a + X + Zwhere Yt is the behavioral outcome, Y, for task, t.  X represents a 
vector of sleep-related variables, which includes the experimentally manipulated measures of 
sleep restriction and circadian mismatch and a measure of chronic daytime sleepiness, Epworth 
sleepiness, which is derived from the pre-screen sleep survey. Note that Epworth sleepiness is a 
separate construct from state-level Karolinska self-reported sleepiness elicited during the 
decision sessions (simple correlation = .12 between these two measures).  Z includes 
indicators for the session number (Session 3 dummy indicates the second administration of the 
task) and timing (Morning Session = 1), as well as demographic controls such as age, gender, 
and sub-clinical depression and anxiety risk scores.9  We estimated the models using a random 
effects error structure for multiple observations per subjects.   
Estimation results in Tables 3-6 identify predictors of the key outcome variables for each 
social decision task.  The relevant treatment variables for sleep restriction and circadian 
mismatch are highlighted.  The treatment variable, Mismatch, is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the subject is mismatched relative to her more preferred time of day. Because there exists 
variation in the level of compliance among subjects deemed compliant, a continuous measure 
of sleep level is of interest.  For each decision outcome, two models are estimated to allow for 
different approaches to scoring sleep levels:  The first model uses average nightly actigraphy-
measured sleep during the week prior to the decision, Nightly Sleep, as the continuous variable 
measure for sleep levels.  The second model uses a constructed hybrid measure, Personal Sleep 
Deprivation, which is the difference between a subject’s self-reported optimal nightly sleep 
(from the earlier online sleep survey) and the actigraphy-measured nightly sleep the week prior 
to the decision.  In a sense, the variable Personal SD, handicaps each individual for his/her 
perceived personal sleep need.  Additional estimations are included in the Appendix where 
sleep restriction is coded as a dichotomous indicator variable (SR=0,1) to identify the SR 
treatment week.  Regarding the non-treatment control variables, the Session 3 indicator is 
robustly significant across estimations of the different behavioral outcome measures.  The sign 
                                                          
9
 Recall that subjects at clinical risk levels for depressive or anxiety disorder were not recruited for the study. 
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of the coefficient on Session 3 captures a general tendency to behave in a more self-interested 
fashion during the last session.10   
The estimated coefficients on the circadian mismatch and sleep level variables allow for 
a test of our behavioral hypothesis for each model. The estimated direct effect of circadian 
mismatch on behavioral outcomes is insignificant across all models (Tables 3-6), and so we turn 
our attention to the statistically significant (p ≤ .05) estimated direct effect of sleep restriction 
on behavioral outcomes—these are an indication that sleep restriction may have a greater 
impact on behavior than circadian mismatch, but we should also remind the reader that the 
circadian mismatch dimension of the protocol has less statistical power than the sleep 
restriction dimension.  Regarding sleep restriction, we find significant and robust effects on 
decisions in the Dictator and Trust games.  Results from the Ultimatum game are less 
convincing, which should not be surprising.  The Ultimatum game is standard in this suite of 
tasks, but it confounds self-interest with risk of a zero payoff in both first- and second-mover 
roles (or, the desire to accumulate money is in conflict with the desire for fairness, as noted in 
Sanfey et al., 2003).  We find weak evidence that ultimatum offers may be less generous for 
higher levels of Personal SD (i.e., the more sleep deprived. See Table 3, Model 3), but this effect 
is not robust across alternative coding of the sleep restriction variable (see Table 2 and 
Appendix).   
Turning to the Dictator game, Table 4 identifies a robust result of reduced Dictator 
offers when one is sleep restricted (see also Appendix), which is consistent with our hypothesis.  
The predicted relationship between Dictator offers and Personal SD is shown graphically in 
Figure 2—demographics, session identifier, and sleep related control variables are held 
constant.  Given the lack of a rejection threat in the Dictator game, offers in this game are more 
easily interpreted as a measure of altruism or prosocial behavior than are decisions in the 
                                                          
10
 The same is generally true of results from the Control subjects, although there are only 30 such subjects.  The 
only generally significant variable is the Session 3, variable which, when statistically significant, indicates and 
increased greed in choice.  Unlike the data from the Treatment subjects, however, Control subjects are not 
significantly less trustworthy during the last session than the first decision session.  Because of the small sample of 
Control Subjects, and the fact that each Treatment subject serves as his/her own baseline regarding the sleep 
restriction effect, we do not report Control Subject estimations here.  They are available on request. 
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Ultimatum game results.11  The size of the estimated effect is also non-trivial.  Compared to a 
fairly typical $3 offer in a Dictator game when not sleep-restricted (Personal SD=0), that same 
individual being 2 hours sleep-restricted per night (120 minutes) chronically sleep restricted 
would offer $2.40.  This represents a 20% reduction in Dictator giving level.12 
Tables 5 and 6 show additional evidence of decreased prosocial behavior in the Trust 
game when sleep restricted.  Table 5 also includes results from a “risk” version of the Trust 
game where it is common knowledge for subjects that the second-mover is an automated pass-
back algorithm.13  As can be seen in Table 5, the significant reduction in trust due to sleep 
restriction occurs only when trust is imbedded in a social interaction (albeit a one-shot and 
anonymous interaction in this task).  The reduction in trust is also significant because it 
documents how commonplace levels of sleep restriction introduce an inefficiency into the 
domain of social interactions.  The predicted Trust game result is depicted in Figure 3, and the 
magnitude of reduced initial trust amount indicates a lost potential in the 2-person exchange 
that is economically significant.  The size of the predicted reduction in trust is similar to the 
reduction in the Dictator game ($.50-$.60), but this represents a slightly smaller effect in 
percentage terms relative to typical trust levels, which are around $5-$6 out of a $10 pie (see 
Berg et al, 1995). 
Trustworthiness results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 4.  Here, given the strategy-
method nature of choice elicitation, the dependent variable is the average percentage passed 
back by the second-mover over all possible initially trusted amounts.  We also include an 
                                                          
11
 Of course, the Dictator game is not itself without confounds in interpretation as Dictator giving may reflect 
concerns that the experimenter knows of one’s decision, or may reflect aversion to payoff inequality (see Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).  Nevertheless, such factors are present in both the SR and WR decisions of subject, and any 
amount of giving intended to reduce inequality aversion can be considered a different form of prosocial behavior. 
12
 The magnitude of the estimated effect is only slightly smaller—about a 16%-17% reduction—if using Nightly 
Sleep (model 1, Table 4) or a dichotomous scoring of SR (see Appendix, Table S2).  In general, the magnitude as 
well as the significance of each estimated effect is similar, if not greater, using these alternative scorings of sleep 
restriction, and so we choose to focus on the measure Personal SD throughout the main text for displaying the 
results relative to an easily-understood benchmark of Personal SD = 0 (where someone is getting exactly the 
amount of sleep she thinks she needs). 
13
 That is, subjects were informed prior to making decisions that the risk associated with the first mover decision in 
this game was not a function of another individual’s choice in the current experiment group, but rather the 
amount “passed back” was a draw from a distribution that reflected typical pass back amounts from previous 
experiments. Previous research with social decision tasks has highlighted that behavior with a real human 
counterpart may differ from behavior when matched with a computerized or algorithmic counterpart (e.g., Kosfeld 
et al., 2005; Krajbich et al., 2009). 
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additional model in Table 6 (far-right column) where we average the percentage pass-back 
decisions over the subset of amounts where at least half the monetary pie is initially trusted.  
This evaluates whether sleep restriction impacts trustworthiness differently when the initial 
signal of trust is most clear.14  As can be seen in Table 6, sleep restriction significantly decreases 
trustworthiness, and the effect is also robust.  Moreover, the effect is largest in magnitude and 
estimated with the most precision when evaluating trustworthiness in the face of strong initial 
signals of trust.  In other words, sleep restriction harms trustworthiness more when the truster 
is most vulnerable, which should be concerning.  Figure 4 shows that the effect size of the 
result in Table 6, column 2, is somewhat smaller than the Dictator or Trust effects of sleep 
restriction.  Nevertheless, it is a robust result that indicates an approximate 7% reduction in 
trustworthiness over a baseline rate of 33% trustworthiness in response to an additional 2 
hours of chronic sleep restriction.15 
Given the Trust game results, one might argue that the SR effect of reduced trust is due 
to an accurate anticipation of reduced trustworthiness.  Our data cannot directly test this, but 
we reject this interpretation for two reasons:  First, the argument is not consistent with the 
Ultimatum results—there is at least some marginal evidence that SR increases first-mover 
greed (model 2 in Table 3; Table 7 discussed below), and yet there is no predicted change in 
MAOs.  Second, this interpretation requires anticipation skills that have neural correlates in 
brain regions harmed by sleep loss (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).  Dickinson and McElroy (2012) 
also showed direct behavioral evidence that decisions requiring such anticipatory skills suffer 
from adverse sleep states.16  
    
    2.1  Sleep and Circadian mismatch interaction analysis 
                                                          
14
 In this case, the strength of the initial trust signal is also significant because more than half the pie initially 
trusted implies the first-mover is exposing herself to being exploited by the trustee. 
15
 Here, the baseline trustworthiness of 33% is the approximate level of predicted trustworthiness for somewhat 
who is not sleep restricted (Personal SD = 0), and it also represents the Rate-of-Return breakeven level of 
trustworthiness for first-movers to recuperate their initial “investment” given the tripled-investment rule. 
16 Results in Tables 3-6, as well as Appendix Table S2, are also robust to the exclusion of extreme sleeper subjects 
who were personally sleep deprived > 2.5 hours (SR condition) or < ½ hour (WR condition).  Standard errors 
increase slightly, though key results are still statistically significant at p < .10 or better.  The magnitude of the 
estimated effects from removing the more extreme sleepers, not surprisingly, is slightly reduced. 
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Van Dongen and Dinges (2003) and Burke et al (2015) suggest that sleep and circadian 
misalignment may have interactive effects, and other behavioral research has suggested that 
adverse sleep states may have cumulative effects (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010).  We explore 
the possibility of interaction effects in Table 7. Here, we show results of estimations that 
include an interaction variable between circadian mismatch (MM=1) and the Personal SD 
variable used previously in the Tables 3-6 specifications.  Consistent with these earlier 
estimations, significant adverse sleep state effects (on Dictator offers, trust, and 
trustworthiness decisions) are linked to Personal SD and not circadian mismatch.  One 
difference with earlier estimations is that we find subjects with higher Personal SD pass less 
money in the trust game even when the second mover is a pass-back algorithm.  However, this 
finding should not be considered robust given its absence from other specifications we 
estimated. Perhaps surprisingly, Table 7 results show no significant interaction effect on 
Personal SD*MM. Thus, our data do not show evidence of a magnified behavioral effect in 
subjects who are both sleep restricted and circadian mismatched.17  
Relatedly, Table 8 shows the mean values and confidence intervals of self-reported 
sleepiness by treatment.  Table 8 shows that, while both SR and MM significantly increase 
sleepiness, it is also clear that the magnitude of the SR effect on sleepiness is larger. The 
insignificant behavioral effects of MM we report may therefore be attributed to the fact that 
MM does not increase sleepiness as much as SR in our design, which may reflect the more 
cumulative effect of nightly chronic partial sleep restriction over the course of an entire week. 
Additionally, one can see from Table 8 that self-reported sleepiness for someone in both SR and 
MM states is not significantly higher than for someone only in the SR state. While it is unclear 
why self-reported sleepiness is not higher when one is both SR and MM, the lack of interaction 
effects in the Table 7 analysis is sensible in light of this finding.18 
                                                          
17
 Full marginal effects of a change in MM and Personal SD (PSD) on each treatment variable are given, in general, 
by MM+(PSD*MM)*PSD and PSD+(PSD*MM)*MM, respectively (evaluated at the mean levels of the treatment  
variables).  However, the coefficients on the interaction term, (PSD*MM), is statistically insignificant in every 
instance.  Our focus is therefore on the main effect of each treatment variable on our behavioral outcomes 
measures. 
18
 It is possible that subjects in a condition of both SR and MM took countermeasures to counteract sleepiness 
(other than naps, which would contribute to noncompliance).  However, the one item on which we collected 
countermeasure data during the decision session—whether caffeine or sugar was consumed in the 3 hours prior to 
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    2.2  Sleepiness as a mediating variable 
Because our manipulations were intended to increase sleepiness, we also evaluate 
whether sleepiness is the primary mediator of these results (Tables 9 and 10).  For the two-step 
estimation we first regress the Karolinska sleepiness scores (KSS) on demographics, session, and 
sleep variables (Table 9).  As noted earlier, both SR and circadian mismatch significantly predict 
higher KSS (p < .01), which is seen in the first stage estimation results.  This provides validation 
for our treatment manipulations and identifies the variation in KSS due to subject-specific 
factors as well.19   
Step two used the predicted KSS values as a covariate (instrument) in the main decision 
outcome estimations.  Table 10 estimates indicate that higher levels of the KSS-instrument 
predict lower levels of ultimatum proposals, dictator altruism, trust, and trustworthiness.  
These estimates indicate that our experimental treatments alter behavioral outcomes through 
their impact on sleepiness.  They also highlight that circadian mismatch, while not estimated to 
directly impact behavioral outcomes, is estimated to indirectly affect social behavior via its 
impact on sleepiness.  In conjunction with our other analysis represented in Tables 3-6, these 
results describe a common theme whereby prosocial decisions decline due to sleepiness that is 
symptomatic of an adverse sleep or circadian state. 
 
3.  Discussion 
We examined the impact of mild but chronic sleep restriction and suboptimal circadian 
timing on decisions in simple social interactions.  The sleep levels studied and the times-of-day 
utilized are highly relevant to what a large segment of the population experiences in everyday 
life.  Because we utilized an ecologically valid setting, and compensatory strategies to combat 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the lab session—did not show significant differences across individual or combined sleep conditions (see Appendix 
Table S1). These data are, however, not precise in terms of standardized size and caffeine/sugar content—we used 
simple count data on self-reported caffeine/sugar consumption prior to the session as a 0/1 variable). 
19 We also note that the impact of gender is implicit in these results.  First-stage estimates show that female 
subjects are significantly sleepier, controlling for other demographics and sleep variables. 
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the sleepiness were not prohibited, our results can be viewed as conservative estimates of the 
impact of common sleep states in the simple games we examined.   
The simple social decision tasks we used are well-known and they form the building 
blocks of more complex interactive environments where social behaviors loom large.  We found 
robust results consistent with the hypothesis that commonly experienced adverse sleep states 
reduce prosocial behaviors.  Our results showing reduced dictator giving are the most precisely 
estimated, although trust and trustworthiness are also found to decrease significantly in most 
specifications.  We hypothesized that adverse sleep states would likely reduce prosocial 
behaviors due to their tendency to reduce deliberative thought.  While we do not have direct 
evidence that our sleep and circadian manipulations impacted prefrontal activation, a body of 
literature in sleep science clearly links more extreme adverse sleep states (e.g., total sleep 
deprivation) to disproportionate reductions in PFC activation, as well as altered emotional 
response region activation. For example, sleepy subjects may experience increased fear of 
betrayal as a mechanism that results in reduced trust, as was proposed in an earlier study 
(Anderson and Dickinson, 2010). While suggestive, we also note that our sleep restriction 
manipulation produced the same general behavioral effects as others have found in patients 
with vmPFC damage (Krajbich et al., 2009). Future research may wish to document the impact 
of these more mild sleep/circadian manipulations on neural activation patterns in order to 
establish direct evidence for the mechanism that drives this behavioral result.   
Our findings imply that commonly experienced adverse sleep states reduce prosocial 
behaviors and lead to unrealized gains in simple social interactions.  A reduction in an 
individual’s social capital has multiplier effects, and so any factor that can be shown to reduce 
prosocial behavior is noteworthy.  One of the main criticisms of recent work identifying the 
decline in social capital in America (Putman, 1995) is the fact that many of the arguments are 
based on correlational data (see critique in Sobel, 2002).  While we do not claim to have 
uncovered the hidden source of decreased social capital during recent decades, we do stand on 
firmer ground in claiming at least one micro-level causal determinant of reduced prosocial 
behavior in these simple environments.  
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    3.1  Conclusions 
Given the prevalence of social interactions in everyday life, it should be concerning to 
identify that sleep restriction adversely impacts prosocial behavior.  This research helps show 
that a common trend in current adult sleep habits may not just affect decision outcomes, but it 
also may undermine the potential to generate value in interpersonal interactions and possibly 
reduce social capital multiplier effects.  Such social “inefficiency” costs of sleepiness are not 
fully appreciated and largely ignored.  Future research should seek to evaluate whether these 
effects are also robust to repeated, longer-term, or non-anonymous interactions.  In the 
meantime, it seems like a piece of timely advice for encouraging prosocial behavior would be to 
tell everyone to “just sleep on it”. 
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Table 1 
Sample Size Per Design Cell (treatment subjects) 
 Morning Session Evening Session 
Morning-type 34 (30) 38 (28) 
Evening-type 39 (30) 38 (31) 
 
Sample size = 149 subjects 
Matched obs = 76, Mismatched obs = 73 
(compliant & sleep data intact shown in parenthesis) 
      Notes:  Circadian mismatches cells shaded 
      Table reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Behavioral Summary Statistics and nonparametric treatment effect tests 
(sample is n=119 compliant treatment subjects.  Data pooled across sessions and subjects) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Ult $$ 
Offer 
 
Ult $$ 
MAO 
 
Dictator   
$$ Offer 
Trust 
person       
$$ Offer  
Trust  
Distribution 
$$ Offer 
Trust-
worthiness 
% passback 
SR=0 
4.49 
(1.04) 
2.87 
(1.77) 
3.44 
(2.00) 
5.19 
(2.47) 
4.62 
(2.58) 
.274 
(.147) 
SR=1 
4.42 
(1.01) 
2.89 
(1.82) 
3.02 
(2.24) 
4.77 
(2.27) 
4.56 
(2.49) 
.261 
(.146) 
Signed-Rank 
(Matched) 
Z= -0.57 
p=.57 
Z= -0.14 
p =.88 
Z= -1.80 
p =.07 
Z= -1.65 
p =.10 
Z= -0.09 
p =.93 
Z= -0.59 
p =.56 
MM=0 
4.42 
(1.04) 
2.77 
(1.75) 
3.33 
(2.01) 
5.04 
(2.34) 
4.43 
(2.42) 
.268 
(.137) 
MM=1 
4.49 
(1.02) 
3.00 
(1.84) 
3.13 
(2.25) 
4.92 
(2.43) 
4.86 
(2.63) 
.267 
(.156) 
Mann-Whitney 
(Unmatched) 
Z= -0.08 
p =.93 
Z= -0.69 
p =.49 
Z= 0.69 
p =.49 
Z= 0.93 
p =.35 
Z= -1.14 
p -.25 
Z= 0.24 
p =.80 
Note:  Significance levels are for 2-tailed tests. Test on SR treatment effect use matched data, whereas MM effect 
tests use unmatched data on each subject’s average behavioral effect across both decision sessions. Alternative 
nonparametric tests (Sign test of SR effect; Median test of MM effect) produce similar results.  For those SR effects 
on Dictator Offers and Trust decision, which had p≤.10 for the 2-tailed signed-rank test, the corresponding p-values 
of the Sign (binomial) test are p=.13, and p=.05, respectively. 
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Table 3: Ultimatum Decisions  
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample) 
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie offered to 2nd-mover 
  
Ultimatum Offers 
(n=234 obs) 
 
Minimum Acceptable Offer 
(n=236 obs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) 
Constant 4.70 (.60)*** 5.29 (.54)*** 4.71 (1.01)*** 4.70 (.94)*** 
Female (=1) -.29 (.18) -.27 (.18) -.61 (.31)** -.62 (.31)** 
Age -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.08 (.04)** -.08 (.04)** 
Depression score .10 (.12) .11 (.12) .02 (.21) .02 (.21) 
Anxiety score -.02 (.04) -.02 (.04) .06 (.07) .06 (.07) 
Epworth score -.01 (.03) -.01 (.03) -.03 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Session #3 -.18 (.09)** -.18 (.09)** -.59 (.13)*** -.59 (.13)*** 
Morning Session (=1) .10 (.17) .10 (.17) .47 (.30) .47 (.30) 
Morningness Score .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) 
Circadian Mismatched (=1) .02 (.17) -.004 (.17) .11 (.30) .11 (.30) 
Nightly Sleep (minutes) .001 (.001) --- -.00003 (.001) --- 
Personal SD (min/night) --- -.0014 (.0007)** --- .00001 (.001) 
Wald chi-squared test (10) 9.43 12.32 31.68*** 31.75*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test 
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Table 4: Dictator Decisions 
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample) 
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie offered to 2nd-mover 
                                                                    Dictator Offers 
                                                                     (n=237 obs) 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) 
Constant 1.39 (1.22)*** 3.96 (1.05)*** 
Female (=1) -.03 (.36) .06 (.35) 
Age -.01 (.04) -.02 (.04) 
Depression score -.23 (.23) -.18 (.23) 
Anxiety score .11 (.08) .10 (.08) 
Epworth score .06 (.05) .06 (.05) 
Session #3 -.71 (.20)*** -.72 (.20)*** 
Morning Session (=1) .29 (.34) .31 (.33) 
Morningness Score -.01 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
Circadian Mismatched (=1) -.22 (.34) -.32 (.33) 
Nightly Sleep (minutes) .004 (.002)** --- 
Personal SD (min/night) --- -.005 (.002)*** 
Wald chi-squared test (10) 23.02*** 29.36*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test 
 
 
Table 5: Trust Decisions 
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample) 
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie trusted to 2nd-mover 
  
Trust person (Social) 
(n=230 obs) 
 
Trust algorithm (Asocial) 
(n=236 obs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) 
Constant 3.91 (1.39)*** 6.51 (1.18)*** 4.48 (1.48)*** 5.40 (1.28)*** 
Female (=1) -.33 (.40) -.24 (.39) -.47 (.43) -.45 (.42) 
Age -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) .01 (.05) .01 (.05) 
Depression score -.27 (.26) -.23 (.26) -.39 (.28) -.36 (.28) 
Anxiety score .10 (.09) .09 (.09) .10 (.09) .09 (.09) 
Epworth score .01 (.06) .01 (.06) -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06) 
Session #3 -.64 (.25)*** -.63 (.25)** -.02 (.25) -.04 (.25) 
Morning Session (=1) .26 (.38) .27 (.38) -.32 (.41) -.31 (.40) 
Morningness Score -.06 (.04) -.06 (.04) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Circadian Mismatched (=1) -.13 (.37) -.21 (.37) .52 (.40) .47 (.40) 
Nightly Sleep (minutes) .005 (.002)** --- .001 (.002) --- 
Personal SD (min/night) --- -.004 (.002)** --- -.003 (.002) 
Wald chi-squared test (10) 15.44 16.07* 6.91 8.58 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test 
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Table 6: Trustworthiness Decisions 
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample) 
Dependent Variable= average % returned (from strategy choice set)   
 
 
(n=234 obs) 
DV = Avg 
Trustworthiness 
over all amounts 
trusted 
DV = Avg 
Trustworthiness 
over all amounts 
trusted 
DV = Avg 
Trustworthiness 
for amounts ≥ $5 
trusted 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error) 
Constant .19 (.09)** .31 (.08)*** .41 (.08)*** 
Female (=1) -.01 (.03) -.003 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
Age .001 (.003) .0001 (.003) -.001 (.003) 
Depression score -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
Anxiety score .005 (.006) .005 (.006) .008 (.006) 
Epworth score .001 (.004) .001 (.004) .001 (.004) 
Session #3 -.04 (.01)*** -.04 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)*** 
Morning Session (=1) .001 (.03) .002 (.02) .01 (.03) 
Morningness Score -.001 (.002) -.002 (.002) -.002 (.003) 
Circadian Mismatched (=1) .0004 (.02) -.004 (.02) -.01 (.03) 
Nightly Sleep (minutes) .0002 (.0001)* --- --- 
Personal SD (min/night) --- -.0002 (.0001)** -.0003 (.0001)*** 
Wald chi-squared test (10) 12.84 15.60 18.24** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test 
Model 3 shows that Personal SD more strongly impacts trustworthiness when a strong initial trust signal is 
received. 
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Table 7: Analysis of Sleep Restriction and Circadian Mismatch Interaction Effects 
Random effects GLS regressions 
Standard errors clustered on subject in parenthesis (2 observations per subject) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Ult $$ 
Offer 
 
Ult $$ 
MAO 
 
Dictator   
$$ Offer 
Trust 
person       
$$ Offer  
Trust  
Distribution 
$$ Offer 
Trust-
worthiness^ 
% passback 
Constant 
5.26 
(.54)*** 
4.65 
(.95)*** 
4.03 
(1.06)*** 
6.54 
(1.20)*** 
5.70 
(1.30)*** 
.31 
(.08)*** 
Female (=1) 
-.27 
(.18) 
-.62 
(.32)** 
.06 
(.34) 
-.24 
(.39) 
-.43 
(.42) 
-.003 
(.03) 
Age 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.08 
(.04)** 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.04) 
.01 
(.05) 
.0002 
(.003) 
Depression score 
.11 
(.12) 
.02 
(.21) 
-.18 
(.23) 
-.23 
(.26) 
-.35 
(.28) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Anxiety score 
-.02 
(.03) 
.06 
(.07) 
.10 
(.08) 
.09 
(.09) 
.09 
(.09) 
.005 
(.006) 
Epworth score 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.04) 
.06 
(.05) 
.01 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.06) 
.001 
(.004) 
Session #3 
-.19 
(.09)** 
-.59 
(.13)*** 
-.72 
(.20)*** 
-.63 
(.25)** 
-.03 
(.25) 
-.04 
(.01)*** 
Morning Session 
(=1) 
.11 
(.18) 
.48 
(.30) 
.30 
(.33) 
.27 
(.38) 
-.39 
(.41) 
.003 
(.02) 
Morningness 
Score 
.01 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.06 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.002 
(.002) 
MM (=1) 
.06 
(.22) 
.19 
(.37) 
-.43 
(.45) 
-.27 
(.53) 
-.13 
(.55) 
.0001 
(.03) 
Personal SD 
-.001 
(.001) 
.0004 
(.001) 
-.006 
(.002)*** 
-.005 
(.003)* 
-.005 
(.003)** 
-.0002 
(.0001)* 
Personal SD*MM 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.003) 
.001 
(.004) 
.006 
(.004) 
-.00004 
(.0002) 
N 234 236 237 230 236 234 
Wald 2 (11) 12.50 31.75*** 29.35*** 16.03 10.96 15.58 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.   
^ 
Estimation of the Trustworthiness model using the alternative dependent variable of average returned amount 
when 50% or more of pie is trusted shows that the Personal SD reduced trustworthiness when high levels of trust 
are at stake ( = -.0003, p <.05), and there is no significant effect of MM or the Personal SD*MM interaction. 
 
Table 8: Karolinska Sleepiness Score (KSS) by Condition 
Treatment 
Combination 
KSS 
Mean 
Robust St Errors 
(clustered on subj) 
 
[95% CI] 
SR=0 & MM=0 3.934 .173 [3.591, 4.278] 
SR=1 & MM=0 6.621 .193 [6.234, 7.002] 
SR=0 & MM=1 5.018 .243 [4.535, 5.500] 
SR=1 & MM=1 6.473 .218 [6.041, 6.906] 
Note: self-reported sleepiness is based on average KSS from each 
decision session (measures taken at beginning and end of the session).    
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Table 9: Instrumental Variables Estimation to examine sleepiness mediating effects.  First-stage 
estimation of determinants of self-reported sleepiness. 
1st-Stage Regression (errors clustered on subject) 
KSleepy estimated using following instruments: Demographic/Session variables: Session#3, Female, Age, 
Anxiety Score, Depression Score, Morning Session, Epworth Score. rMEQ score, Personal SD, Mismatch 
Predictors of KSleepy :  Coefficient (st error) 
 
Demographic/Session Indicators Sleep Related Variables 
                   Session#3:   -.365 (.225)                          
                       Female:     .877 (.245)*** 
                             Age:     .048 (.021)** 
           Anxiety Score:    -.040 (.047)          
      Depression Score:   -.282 (.155)*  
       Morning Session:   -.649 (.208)*** 
 
            Epworth Score:    .073 (.035)** 
                 rMEQ score:    .008 (.022) 
                Personal SD:     .010 (.001)*** 
                   Mismatch:     .865 (.212)*** 
 
 
           Model F – test (10 , 226) = 10.86*** 
Notes:  *, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
Experimental treatment variables Personal SD and Mismatch both are estimated to significantly increase self-
reported sleepiness (p < .01).  Minor differences in number of observations across tasks (e.g., small number of 
blank responses) are noted in 2
nd
-stage regression N below.  This implies minor differences in estimated 
coefficients and standard errors for the 1
st
-stage regression equations.  Shown above are the 1
st
-stage results of 
the Dictator game model, which are similar in sign and significance to all other 1-stage equations. 
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Table 10: Instrumental Variables Estimations to examine sleepiness mediating effects.  Second-stage 
estimations of behavioral outcomes using instrumented values of self-reported sleepiness. 
 
2nd-Stage Regression:  KSleepy instrumented from 1st-stage regression 
Standard errors clustered on subject (2 observations per subject) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Ultimatum $$ 
Offer 
 
Ultimatum 
$$ MAO 
 
Dictator  
$$ Offer 
Trust 
person       
$$ Offer  
Trust  
algorithm 
$$ Offer 
Trust-
worthiness 
% passback 
KSleepy(instr) 
-.17 
(.08)** 
-.04 
(13) 
-.46 
(.16)*** 
-.35 
(.16)** 
-.17 
(.17) 
-.02 
(.01)** 
Session #3 
-.25 
(.10)** 
-.60 
(.14)*** 
-.88 
(.22)*** 
-.79 
(.27)*** 
-.10 
(.25) 
-.04 
(.02)*** 
Female 
-.13 
(.15) 
-.59 
(.31)* 
.42 
(.37) 
-.002 
(.04) 
-.41 
(.45) 
.01 
(.03) 
age 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.06 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.005 
(.04) 
.0001 
(.002) 
Depression 
score 
.06 
(.09) 
.002 
(.19) 
-.30 
(.22) 
-.27 
(.27) 
-.34 
(.28) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Anxiety score 
-.03 
(.03) 
.05 
(.07) 
.12 
(.07) 
.10 
(.07) 
.09 
(.07) 
.005 
(.005) 
Constant 
5.91 
(.71)*** 
4.83 
(1.19)*** 
5.93 
(1.31)*** 
7.44 
(1.22)** 
5.75 
(1.27)*** 
.38 
(.09)*** 
N 234 236 237 230 236 234 
Wald 
2 10.42 30.97*** 25.45*** 12.19* 5.89 11.91* 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.   
The same 2SLS model run using the alternative Trustworthiness variable (i.e., average percentage passed back on 
all possible first-mover trusted amounts of at least half the pie), shows similar results to the Trustworthiness 
model above, except that the magnitude of the instrumented KSleepy variable is slightly larger in magnitude (-.023 
vs -.019) and estimated a bit more precisely (p = .03 vs p = .038).  This is consistent with what we report in the text 
that the impact of sleep restriction (here, via the mediating variable, KSleepy) to reduce trustworthiness is 
somewhat magnified for those decisions involving a more sizeable and clear signal of trust by the first-mover. 
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FIGURE 1:  Protocol Details and Timeline 
 
Note:  Figure reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Predicted Dictator Offers (Altruism) 
 
NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 4 with levels of all statistically  
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD 
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects. Results show that when 
dictators are more chronically sleep restricted, they are less altruistic. 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Personal SD (min/night week prior) 
Offer  
(of $10 pie) 
-140 0 340 180 
slope p ≤ .01 
Dictator Altruism 
compliant treatment subjects (n=237, 2 
obs per subject) 
Week #1 Week #3 Week #2 
Session 1 Session 3 Session 2 No Session 
   
Treatment Week 
(SR or WR) 
Opposite Treatment 
Week (WR or SR) 
Ad Lib Sleep Week 
(washout) 
7:30 am 
     or 
10:00 pm 
Informed Consent, 
Sleep watch/diary 
instructions 
7:30 am 
or 
10:00 pm 
Decision 
Experiments 
    7:30 am 
   or 
    10:00 pm 
Decision 
Experiments 
 
Note: morning or evening session time 
Randomly assigned, but remained 
constant across sessions 
SR treatment week = prescribed 5-6 hr/night in bed attempting to sleep, naps discouraged. Sleep diaries kept. 
WR treatment week = prescribed 8-9 hr/night in bed attempting to sleep, naps discouraged. Sleep diaries kept. 
Ad lib sleep week = subject sleep however much/little they like.  Sleep diaries kept. 
Sessions:  Subjects come to research lab in each instance. 
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Figure 3:  Predicted Trust Levels 
 
NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 5 with levels of all statistically  
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD 
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects.  Results show that when 
subjects are more chronically sleep restricted, they trust less of the $10 pie. 
Non-human trust line shows predicted trust when 2
nd
-mover is known to be 
an automatic pass-back algorithm as opposed to another subject. Trusted 
amounts in non-human trust are not significantly affected by Personal SD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Predicted Trustworthiness 
 
NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 6 with levels of all statistically  
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD 
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects.  Results show that when 
subjects are more chronically sleep restricted, they are less trustworthy. 
(i.e., average % of pie returned is lower). 
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APPENDIX A (Data and Analysis) 
 
Sleep Data Acquisition 
Actigraphy data acquisition (Actiwatch Spectrum Plus devices; Philips Respironics) was at 30-second 
time epochs.   Each epoch is initially scored as “sleep” or “wake” with manufacturer’s software.  Rest 
period start/end times are then adjusted manually, if necessary, using subject-entered actigraph event 
markers and with the input of complementary sleep diaries.  All manual scoring is conducted using 
validated scoring protocols (Goldman et al, 2007). 
The devices use an MEMS type accelerometer and sample data at 32 Hz.  Devices are waterproof at 1m 
for 30 minutes and so subjects were instructed to wear them 24 hr a day during the 3-week protocol, 
except for the exceptional removal to avoid device damage (e.g., contact sports, working with 
chemicals, etc).  Battery life at 30-second data sampling epochs is over 30 days and so subjects had no 
concerns with battery life or device recharge. 
Sample Information 
A comprehensive analysis of attrition, compliance, and validation of the protocol in generating 
significant differences in sleepiness can be found in Dickinson et al (2016).  A total of 256 subjects were 
recruited for the study.  Of these, 35 (14%) failed to show up for Session 1, and of the remaining 221 
subjects, 184 completed the protocol (n=30 control subjects, n=154 treatment subjects).  Higher 
depression risk scores on the primary care PHQ-2 screening questionnaire (Kroenke, Spitzer, and 
Williams, 2003) predict a lower likelihood of showing up for the first study session (after recruitment 
signup), and they additionally predict a lower likelihood of completing the protocol conditional on 
showing up for the first session.  Higher scores on the anxiety disorder risk screener GAD-7 (Spitzer et al, 
2006) predict an increased likelihood of completing the protocol, conditional on starting the protocol 
(i.e., showing up for the first study session).  It should be noted that scores on these two primary care 
screening questionnaires have some predictive power regarding selection and attrition in our sample, 
even though subjects surpassing the standard primary care cutoff for risk of depressive or anxiety 
disorder were not recruited at all.  In other words, the variation in the screener score results within the 
“safe zone” (i.e., below the cutoff that typically generates follow-up screening for these disorders) 
explains some of the final sample qualities.  For this result, these screener scores are included in the 
main statistical analysis as a way to account for their potential effects on behavioral outcomes via their 
impact on predicting protocol completion.  The only other demographic or session control variable 
predicting study completion was Morning Session, where we find that subjects randomly assigned to a 
morning session group were more likely to finish the protocol conditional on starting the protocol. 
Of the 184 subjects completing the study, actigraphy malfunction caused the loss of data on a few 
subjects, such that we have 179 subjects (n=30 control subjects, n=149 treatment subjects) of complete 
actigraphy data.  Using our standard for compliance for treatment subjects, which requires a subject to 
have at least a ≥ 60 minutes difference between nightly sleep during the well-rested compared to sleep-
restricted weeks, we have 119 compliant treatment subjects—a compliance rate of about 80% (n=30 
control subjects were 100% compliant).  Figure S1 shows the average nightly sleep levels based on 
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scored actigraphy data for the treatment versus control subjects for the different weeks of the protocol.  
Figure S2 shows the distribution of differences (WR-SR) of nightly sleep amounts for the treatment 
versus control subjects.  As can be seen from Fig. S2, a compliance standard of a treatment week 
difference of at least 60 min/night sleep is statistically sound.  That is, a subject drawn at random from 
our study who has at least this 60 min difference between nightly sleep amounts in the two treatment 
weeks is unlikely to have been drawn from the control subject sample (see distribution overlap points). 
 
Figure S1:  Nightly Sleep Averages (actigraphy measured)  
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Figure S2: Sleep difference distributions (control vs. treatment subjects) 
 
Note: Figure reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016) 
 
 In the main text, we report significant increases in subjective sleepiness as a result of both the sleep 
restriction and circadian mismatch manipulations.  There is some evidence that the overall effectiveness 
of the manipulation is stronger regarding the sleep restriction manipulation, compared to the circadian 
mismatch manipulation.  This claim is substantiated from data on a subset of n=80 of our subjects for 
whom we administered the PANAS instrument to measure positive and negative affective states 
(Watson et al, 1988).  Sleep restriction is found to significantly increase subject self-reported irritability 
and decrease self-reported alertness.  The same is not true of the circadian mismatch manipulation as 
there is no estimated difference in these mood states resulting from the mismatch manipulation.,  
 
We also collected self-report data on caffeine and/or sugar consumption in the 3 hours prior to the lab 
session, scored as a dichotomous variable as equal to 1 without regard to quantity of either as specific 
quantities were not elicited.  Table S1 below shows no evidence of significant differences in either items 
as a function of sleep condition, though the mean level is somewhat higher in the SR=1 MM=0 data. 
 
Table S1: Self-report Caffeine and/or Sugar consumption (Caf/Sug=1) 
Treatment 
Combination 
Caf/Sug 
Mean 
Robust St Errors 
(clustered on subj) 
 
[95% CI] 
SR=0 & MM=0 .328 .060 [208, .447] 
SR=1 & MM=0 .403 .063 [.279, .527] 
SR=0 & MM=1 .333 .063 [.209, .458] 
SR=1 & MM=1 .339 .064 [.213, .465] 
Note: self-reported caffeine and/or sugar consumption is elicited at the  
beginning of the decision session.   
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Average Nightly Actigraphy Sleep Differences (Weeks 1 & 3)
Avg = 0.05 ± 25.87 
Avg = 92.65 ± 40.44  
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Statistical Analysis:  Additional Estimations 
 
Table S2 below shows results from estimations that using only a dichotomous scoring of sleep-
restriction (SR=1 or 0).  In general, the results are similar to what is reported in the text using the more  
informative continuous measure of sleep restriction, though significance is reduced as one would 
expect.  The trustworthiness result is only significant when considering how SR impacts trustworthiness 
in the fact of high initial trust levels, which is again consistent with estimations reported in the main 
text. 
 
Table S2: Key Outcome Estimations with categorical variables only for experimental manipulation (along 
with controls for morningness/eveningness preference, session time-of-day, and session number) 
 
Random effects GLS regressions 
Standard errors clustered on subject (2 observations per subject) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Ultimatum 
$$ Offer 
 
Ultimatum 
$$ MAO 
 
Dictator   
$$ Offer 
Trust 
person       
$$ Offer  
Trust  
Distribution 
$$ Offer 
Trust-
worthiness^ 
% passback 
SR (=1) 
 
-.084 
(.088) 
-.019 
(.131) 
-.491 
(.199)** 
-.476 
(.248)* 
-.076 
(.249) 
-.017 
(.013) 
MM (=1) 
 
.077 
(.170) 
.234 
(.300) 
-.217 
(.333) 
-.119 
(.363) 
.521 
(.396) 
-.001 
(.024) 
Morning 
Session (=1) 
.079 
(.169) 
.362 
(.300) 
.284 
(.333) 
.273 
(.363) 
-.288 
(.396) 
.003 
(.024) 
MEQ score 
(higher=MT) 
.0007 
(.015) 
-.012 
(.027) 
-.016 
(.030) 
-.053 
(.033) 
-.024 
(.036) 
-.001 
(.002) 
Session #3 (=1) 
-.175 
(.088)** 
-.590 
(.131)*** 
-.704 
(.199)*** 
-.622 
(.248)** 
-.014 
(.249) 
-.037 
(.013)*** 
Constant Term 
4.503 
(.245)*** 
2.044 
(.429)*** 
3.994 
(.488)*** 
6.102 
(.537)*** 
4.818 
(.583)*** 
.303 
(.035)*** 
N 234 236 237 230 236 234 
Wald 2 5.05 22.60*** 18.40*** 11.91** 2.84 9.36* 
Notes: *,**, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.   
^ 
Estimation of the Trustworthiness model using the alternative dependent variable of returned amounts when 
50% or more of pie is trusted shows that the sleep restriction treatment reduced trustworthiness when high levels 
of trust are at stake ( = -.024, p <.05). 
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Finally, we present a graphical depiction of the trustworthiness results for the reader to compare 
outcomes with the return amount that would equate payoffs versus the return amount that would 
generate a zero rate of return (ROR) for the truster.  As can been seen in Figures S3, the impact of SD or 
MM on pass-back levels is to reduce them.  The Figures highlight how pass-back levels, overall, approach 
payoff equality levels for the higher initial trust levels. 
Figure S3: Trustworthiness Distributions (by sleep condition) 
 
 
Notes:  This Fig. S3 does not control for other variables or take into account the repeat-administration nature of 
the data and is for illustrative purposes only.  ROR is the rate-of-return on the first-mover’s investment or amount 
trusted.  Because the experimenter triples whatever amount is initially trusted, a one-third trustworthiness level 
will return back the invested capital to the first-mover.  The Payoff Equal amount takes into account that only the 
first-mover is endowed with the initial $10 to trust or not.  For example, if all $10 is trusted, then the second-
mover possesses $30 (and the first mover possesses zero).  The second-mover will have to send back 50% to 
guarantee equal payoffs of $15 for each. 
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APPENDIX B (Task Instructions) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS (Common to all 4 Decision Environments) 
 
This experiment task involves a series of decisions between you and a randomly chosen counterpart 
from your experiment group.  There are 4 different “Decision Environments” in which you must make 
decisions.  When all decisions have been completed, only one of the Decision Environments will be 
chosen (at random) and used for actual payoff based on you and your counterpart’s decision.  The 
counterpart with whom you are randomly matched for this task will remain anonymous to you, and you 
will remain anonymous to him/her.  Below, we will describe the common features of each of the 4 
Decision Environments.  The decision sheets that follow will then present the unique details of each 
Decision Environment and your choices for each environment are made on those sheets. 
 
 Rounds and Matchings:  Each Decision Environment is a one-round decision experiment, in 
which you will be randomly matched with an anonymous counterpart.  You will never know who 
your counterpart is in this experiment.   
 Roles:  There are two roles in each Decision Environment.  One of the roles is the initial decision 
maker or “first mover”, and the other role is the responder or “second mover”.   
 Decisions for each role:  We will ask you to make a decision for both roles in each Decision 
Environment.  In fact, you will not know which role you are assigned in the Decision 
Environment that is randomly chosen for pay until after all decisions are made.  Thus, at the 
time of making your decisions you do not know whether you will end up being the first mover or 
second mover in this task. 
 Only one Decision Environment will count:  Once all decisions have been made (both first 
mover and second mover decisions) by all subjects, decision sheets for this task will be 
collected.  At the end of today’s session, the experimenters will then randomly choose one of 
the four Decision Environments to count for pay.  There is an equal chance that any of the four 
Decision Environments will be selected for pay. 
 Random counterpart assignment:  Once a Decision Environment is randomly chosen, the 
experimenters will also randomly match subjects to form anonymous pairs.  The identities of 
these assignments will not be revealed to either subject. 
 Random role assignment:  Once pairs have been randomly assigned, the experimenters will also 
randomly assign one subject in the pair to be the first-mover, and the other subject will be the 
second-mover. 
 Payment at end of Session:  For the Decision Environment randomly chosen for pay, you and 
your counterpart’s decision in your randomly assigned roles will determine your payoff for this 
task.  This payoff will not affect your payoffs from any other part of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
(Instructions for the 4 decision environments follow.  Note to Readers: Decision Environments 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 are the Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust (human), and Trust (algorithm) tasks, respectively). 
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #1 
 
First Mover Decision:  You must propose a division of $10 between you and your randomly 
chosen counterpart.  Choices can be made in $.25 increments, and any proposal is allowed as long as the 
amount you keep plus the amount the second-mover receives sum to $10.  In this Decision Environment 
#1, the second-mover may choose to either accept or reject your proposal (and rejection implies you 
will both get a zero payoff).   
 DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER 
 If randomly assigned as the first-mover in Decision Environment #1 (and Decision Environment 
#1 is chosen to count for real payoffs), then your decision here, along with the responder’s decision, will 
determine your payoff. 
I propose to divide the $10 as follows: 
   I keep=   The second-mover receives= 
 
********************************************************************************* 
 DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER 
You must indicate whether to accept or reject each of the possible proposals that could be made 
by the first-mover.  Please make an “Accept” or “Reject” choice for each and every possibility in the 
Table below.  Your decision for a particular proposal will determine your actual payoff (and the first-
mover’s payoff) should this Decision Environment be selected to count for real payoffs and you are 
assigned as the second-mover. 
Proposal amount 
(i.e., the amount you would 
receive out of the $10 amount) 
My choice 
A=accept 
R=reject 
 Proposal amount 
(i.e., the amount you would 
receive out of the $10 amount) 
My choice 
A=accept 
R=reject 
$0.00   $5.25  
$.25   $5.50  
$.50   $5.75  
$.75   $6.00  
$1.00   $6.25  
$1.25   $6.50  
$1.50   $6.75  
$1.75   $7.00  
$2.00   $7.25  
$2.25   $7.50  
$2.50   $7.75  
$2.75   $8.00  
$3.00   $8.25  
$3.25   $8.50  
$3.50   $8.75  
$3.75   $9.00  
$4.00   $9.25  
$4.25   $9.50  
$4.50   $9.75  
$4.75   $10.00  
$5.00     
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
40 
 
DECISION ENVIRONMENT #2 
First Mover Decision:  You must propose a division of $10 between you and your randomly 
chosen counterpart.  Choices can be made in $.25 increments, and any proposal is allowed as long as the 
amount you keep plus the amount the second-mover receives sum to $10.  In this Decision Environment 
#2, the second-mover must accept your proposal (i.e., it cannot be rejected).   
  
DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER 
 If randomly assigned as the first-mover in Decision Environment #2 (and Decision Environment 
#2 is chosen to count for real payoffs), then your decision here, along with the responder’s decision, will 
determine your payoff. 
I propose to divide the $10 as follows: 
   I keep=   The second-mover receives= 
********************************************************************************* 
 
 
 DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER 
In Decision Environment #2, the second-mover has no choice to make and must simply accept 
the first-mover’s decision. 
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #3 
First Mover Decision:  You start this experiment with $10.  You must now choose how much (if 
any) of this amount to keep and how much (if any) if this amount to pass to the second-mover. Choices 
can be made in $.50 increments.  Whatever amount is passed to the second-mover will be TRIPLED by 
the experimenter.  The second-mover will be given a choice of how much, if any, of the tripled amount 
he/she wishes to pass back to the first-mover.  Your pass/keep decision will be binding should you be 
assigned the role of first-mover and Decision Environment #3 is randomly chosen for payment. 
DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER 
If I am assigned to be the first mover in this task, I choose to  
         KEEP= 
         PASS= 
******************************************************************************** 
DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER 
If the first-mover decides to pass any amount from the initial $10.00 dollars along to you, this amount is 
multiplied by 3.  At this point, you must then decide how much (if any) to pass back to the first mover.  
Whatever you do not pass back is yours to keep and would be your experimental earnings in this 
Decision Environment #3.  Please decide (below) how much (if any) to pass back for each of the possible 
first-mover decisions below.  Your pass/keep decision for any particular contingency will be binding 
should you be assigned the role of second-mover and should Decision Environment #3 be randomly 
chosen for payment. 
Amount received by second 
mover 
(i.e., the amount passed by the 
first mover multiplied by 3) 
I (second 
mover) 
choose to 
pass back 
 Amount received by second 
mover 
(i.e., the amount passed by the 
first mover multiplied by 3) 
I (second 
mover) 
choose to 
pass back 
$0.00   $15.00  
$1.50   $16.50  
$3.00   $18.00  
$4.50   $19.50  
$6.00   $21.00  
$7.50   $22.50  
$9.00   $24.00  
$10.50   $25.50  
$12.00   $27.00  
$13.50   $28.50  
   $30.00  
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #4 
First Mover Decision:  You start this experiment with $10.  You must now choose how much (if 
any) of this amount to keep and how much (if any) if this amount to pass to the second-mover. Choices 
can be made in $.50 increments.  Whatever amount is passed to the second-mover will be TRIPLED by 
the experimenter.  The second-mover will be given a choice of how much, if any, of the tripled amount 
he/she wishes to pass back to the first-mover.  Your pass/keep decision will be binding should you be 
assigned the role of first-mover and Decision Environment #3 is randomly chosen for payment. 
*In Decision Environment #4, the second-mover is a computerized choice algorithm (i.e., not a 
real person).  The computerized choice will mechanically choose an amount to pass back to the first-
mover.  The computerized (mechanical) choice is based on the distribution of actual pass-back 
amounts for each of the possible amounts below, as derived from real human decisions.   
(In other words, the computerized pass-back amount will never be an amount that a human 
subject has never chosen, amounts rarely passed back by human subjects will be rarely passed back by 
the computerized second-mover, and the amounts most often passed-back by human subjects are most 
likely to be passed back by the computerized second-mover—this is true for each of the different first-
mover choice contingencies) 
 
DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER 
If I am assigned to be the first mover in this task, I choose to  
         KEEP= 
         PASS= 
******************************************************************************** 
 
DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER 
 There is no decision to make as a second-mover in Decision Environment #4, as the second-
mover is a computerized choice algorithm. 
 
